Files
utility-scripts/isolate
T

251 lines
8.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/bin/bash
# macOS does not provide GNU readlink -e. Keep this compatible with Bash 3.2.
resolve_path() (
local path="${1}" links=0 directory
[[ "${path}" = /* ]] || path="${PWD}/${path}"
while :; do
if [[ -d "${path}" ]]; then
cd -P -- "${path}" && pwd -P
exit "${?}"
fi
directory="${path%/*}"
cd -P -- "${directory:-/}" || exit 1
path="${PWD%/}/${path##*/}"
if [[ ! -L "${path}" ]]; then
if [[ ! -e "${path}" ]]; then
echo "Cannot resolve ${1}" >&2
exit 1
fi
printf '%s\n' "${path}"
exit
fi
links=$(( ${links} + 1 ))
if [[ "${links}" -gt 40 ]]; then
echo "Too many symlinks in ${1}" >&2
exit 1
fi
path=$( readlink "${path}" ) || exit 1
[[ "${path}" = /* ]] || path="${PWD}/${path}"
done
)
platform=$( uname -s ) || exit 1
case "${platform}" in
Linux)
if ! bubblewrap=$( command -v bwrap ); then
echo "bubblewrap (bwrap) is required" >&2
exit 1
fi
;;
Darwin)
if ! sandbox_exec=$( command -v sandbox-exec ); then
echo "sandbox-exec is required on macOS" >&2
exit 1
fi
;;
*)
echo "Unsupported platform: ${platform}" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
project_dir=$( pwd -P ) || exit 1
home_dir=$( resolve_path "${HOME}" ) || exit 1
agents=(
$( command -v claude )
$( command -v codex )
$( command -v pi )
$( command -v ps ) # for testing
$( command -v ls ) # for testing
$( command -v touch ) # for testing
$( command -v bash ) # for testing
)
if [[ "${project_dir}" = "${home_dir}" ]]; then
echo "Not running in ${HOME}" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ -n "${1}" ]] && [[ -n $( command -v "${1}" ) ]]; then
coder=$( command -v "${1}" ) && shift
else
echo "Please specify a coding agent" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ " ${agents[@]} " =~ " ${coder} " ]]; then
echo "No agent found" >&2
exit 1
fi
declare -a ro_binds
declare -a rw_binds
declare -a bwrap_args
declare -a bind_sources
declare -a bind_destinations
declare -a hidden_paths
if [[ "${platform}" = Linux ]]; then
ro_binds=(
/usr
/lib
/lib64
/bin
/etc/resolv.conf
/etc/hosts
/etc/ssl
/etc/passwd
/etc/group
"${HOME}/sources"
)
else
# System libraries, certificates, and Intel/Apple Silicon Homebrew installs.
# Do not allow all of /System: /System/Volumes/Data also exposes user files.
for readonly_path in /System/Library /System/Volumes/Preboot/Cryptexes /System/Cryptexes \
/usr /bin /sbin /opt/homebrew \
/Library/Apple /Library/Developer /Library/Frameworks /Library/Keychains \
/Library/Preferences /private/var/db/dyld /private/var/db/timezone \
/etc/resolv.conf /etc/hosts /etc/ssl /etc/passwd /etc/group "${HOME}/sources"; do
if [[ -e "${readonly_path}" ]]; then
ro_binds+=("${readonly_path}")
fi
done
fi
for readonly_path in "${HOME}/.gitconfig" "${HOME}/bin" "${HOME}/.local" "${HOME}/.atuin" "${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}"; do
if [[ -e "${readonly_path}" ]]; then
ro_binds+=("${readonly_path}")
fi
done
for readwrite_path in /tmp "${HOME}/.claude" "${HOME}/.claude.json" "${HOME}/.local/share/claude" "${HOME}/.pi" "${project_dir}"; do
if [[ -e "${readwrite_path}" ]]; then
rw_binds+=("${readwrite_path}")
fi
done
# Resolve mount sources, but keep the paths applications expect as destinations.
for readonly_path in "${ro_binds[@]}"; do
bind_source=$( resolve_path "${readonly_path}" ) || exit 1
bwrap_args+=("--ro-bind" "${bind_source}" "${readonly_path}")
bind_sources+=("${bind_source}")
bind_destinations+=("${readonly_path}")
done
for readwrite_path in "${rw_binds[@]}"; do
bind_source=$( resolve_path "${readwrite_path}" ) || exit 1
bwrap_args+=("--bind" "${bind_source}" "${readwrite_path}")
bind_sources+=("${bind_source}")
bind_destinations+=("${readwrite_path}")
done
git_config="${project_dir}/.git/config"
git_worktree_config="${project_dir}/.git/config.worktree"
if [[ -f "${project_dir}/.git" ]]; then
# Linked worktrees keep their shared and per-worktree config elsewhere.
git_config=$( git -C "${project_dir}" rev-parse --path-format=absolute --git-path config ) || exit 1
git_worktree_config=$( git -C "${project_dir}" rev-parse --path-format=absolute --git-path config.worktree ) || exit 1
fi
# Mask secrets after all directory mounts so later binds cannot expose them.
for hide_path in "${git_config}" "${git_worktree_config}" "${project_dir}/.env"; do
if [[ -e "${hide_path}" ]]; then
hide_path=$( resolve_path "${hide_path}" ) || exit 1
hidden_paths+=("${hide_path}")
bwrap_args+=("--ro-bind" /dev/null "${hide_path}")
# A symlinked mount can expose the same file at another destination.
for i in "${!bind_sources[@]}"; do
if [[ "${hide_path}" = "${bind_sources[${i}]}" || "${hide_path}" = "${bind_sources[${i}]}/"* ]]; then
mask_path="${bind_destinations[${i}]}${hide_path#"${bind_sources[${i}]}"}"
if [[ "${mask_path}" != "${hide_path}" ]]; then
bwrap_args+=("--ro-bind" /dev/null "${mask_path}")
fi
fi
done
fi
done
if [[ "${platform}" = Darwin ]]; then
# Seatbelt restricts the host filesystem; it does not provide Linux namespaces.
# Keep path values out of the profile source by using sandbox-exec parameters.
declare -a sandbox_parameters
declare -a macos_write_paths
macos_profile='(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow process-exec process-fork)
(allow process-info* (target same-sandbox))
(allow signal (target same-sandbox))
(allow sysctl-read)
(allow network*)
(allow mach-lookup
(global-name "com.apple.system.logger")
(global-name "com.apple.logd")
(global-name "com.apple.system.notification_center")
(global-name "com.apple.system.opendirectoryd.libinfo")
(global-name "com.apple.system.opendirectoryd.membership")
(global-name "com.apple.SystemConfiguration.configd")
(global-name "com.apple.trustd.agent")
(global-name "com.apple.securityd.xpc"))
(allow file-read-metadata)
; The dynamic loader needs access to the root directory, not its contents recursively.
(allow file-read* (literal "/"))
(allow file-read* (literal "/dev/random") (literal "/dev/urandom") (literal "/dev/zero"))
(allow file-read* file-write* file-ioctl
(literal "/dev/null") (literal "/dev/tty") (literal "/dev/ptmx")
(subpath "/dev/fd") (regex #"^/dev/ttys[0-9]+$"))
(allow pseudo-tty)'
add_macos_rule() {
local action="${1}" operations="${2}" path="${3}" filter="${4:-literal}"
local parameter="PATH_${#sandbox_parameters[@]}"
if [[ -z "${4}" && -d "${path}" ]]; then
filter=subpath
fi
sandbox_parameters+=("-D" "${parameter}=${path}")
macos_profile+=$'\n'"(${action} ${operations} (${filter} (param \"${parameter}\")))"
}
for readonly_path in "${ro_binds[@]}"; do
readonly_path=$( resolve_path "${readonly_path}" ) || exit 1
add_macos_rule allow 'file-read*' "${readonly_path}"
done
for readwrite_path in "${rw_binds[@]}"; do
readwrite_path=$( resolve_path "${readwrite_path}" ) || exit 1
add_macos_rule allow 'file-read* file-write*' "${readwrite_path}"
macos_write_paths+=("${readwrite_path}")
done
# Keep a per-command TMPDIR in addition to access to the shared system /tmp.
sandbox_tmp=$( mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/isolate.XXXXXXXX" ) || exit 1
trap 'rm -rf -- "${sandbox_tmp}"' EXIT
sandbox_tmp=$( resolve_path "${sandbox_tmp}" ) || exit 1
add_macos_rule allow 'file-read* file-write*' "${sandbox_tmp}"
# Later Seatbelt rules win. Keep these denies after every file-access allow.
for hide_path in "${hidden_paths[@]}"; do
add_macos_rule deny 'file-read* file-write*' "${hide_path}"
# Do not let a writable parent (for example .git) be renamed to bypass the deny.
for readwrite_path in "${macos_write_paths[@]}"; do
parent_path="${hide_path%/*}"
while [[ "${parent_path}" = "${readwrite_path}/"* ]]; do
add_macos_rule deny 'file-write-unlink' "${parent_path}" literal
parent_path="${parent_path%/*}"
done
done
done
TMPDIR="${sandbox_tmp}/" "${sandbox_exec}" "${sandbox_parameters[@]}" \
-p "${macos_profile}" "${coder}" "${@}"
exit "${?}"
fi
"${bubblewrap}" \
"${bwrap_args[@]}" \
--proc /proc \
--dev /dev \
--share-net \
--unshare-pid \
--die-with-parent \
--chdir "${project_dir}" \
"${coder}" "${@}"